This paper aims to build an adequate model of emotional consciousness, and to apply it to studies on autism.
Self-consciousness in autism – Under Review
By reviewing an important part of the empirical literature on emotions in autism that has been neglected, I suggest in this paper that the way autistic people relate to their own feelings is explicit and objective whereas neurotypical people rather have an implicit and subjective access to them. This particularity has consequences on several aspects of autistic people’s emotional life that are discussed in this paper.
Social-emotional salience in autism: moving beyond theory of mind (presented at the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, SSPP 2019, Cincinnati) – Under review
In this paper, I argue that Theory of Mind deficits cannot explain emotion recognition particularities, neither with a theory-theory, nor with a simulation approach. I then propose an alternative explanation in terms of social-emotional salience.
Loving objects: can autism explain objectophilia? Co-written with D. Gatzia – Under review
We propose that autism can constitute a better explanation of objectophilia than the other existing attempts of explanation
What are unconscious emotions (presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, SPP 2019, San Diego)
The goal of this paper is to solve the contradiction that emerges from assessing the existence of unconscious emotions by proposing a distinction between two meanings of emotional consciousness that are compatible with the actual leading views on consciousness in neuroscience, without differentiating different senses of “emotions” or of “consciousness”.
Intentionalism and ambivalence of emotions – Co-written with K. Pendoley
We propose that a strong intentionalism account of emotions is compatible with their ambivalence aspect and that transparency is not a threat for emotions.
Explanations of ASD: A spectrum of disorders – Co-written with G.Beaulac
In this paper, we consider several methodological issues in the understanding of autism that lead to the necessity of rejecting the “Extreme-male-brain” hypothesis of autism.
