• Arnaud, S. (2020) “Emotional consciousness in autism” in Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  • Pendoley, K., & Arnaud, S. (2020), “Intentionalism, Ambivalent emotions, and the body”, in B. Brogaard & D. E. Gatzia (eds.), Being of two minds: the philosophy and psychology of ambivalence, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Routledge.
  • Prinz, J., & Arnaud, S. (2020), “Emotions”, in B. Young & C. D. Jennings (eds.), Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience, Part IV (Situating the Mind). Routledge Press.


Under Review

  • Internal intentionalism and the understanding of emotion experience. Written with K. Pendoley
  • Self-consciousness in autism: Self-consciousness in autism: A third-person perspective on the self
    • By reviewing an important part of the empirical literature on emotions in autism that has been neglected, I suggest that autistic people relate to themselves in a third-person perspective, an objective and explicit mode of access, while neurotypical people tend to access the different dimensions of their self through a first-person perspective. This assumption sheds light on different autistic traits involving interactions with others, usage of narratives, sensitivity and interoception, and emotional consciousness.
  • Social-emotional salience in autism: moving beyond theory of mind (presented at the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, SSPP 2019, Cincinnati) 
    • In this paper, I argue that Theory of Mind deficits cannot explain emotion recognition particularities, neither with a theory-theory, nor with a simulation approach. I then propose an alternative explanation in terms of social-emotional salience.
  • Loving objects: can autism explain objectophilia? Co-written with D. Gatzia
    • We propose that autism can constitute a better explanation of objectophilia than the other existing attempts of explanation