Publications

Published or Forthcoming

  • Arnaud, S. (Forthcoming) “Self-consciousness in autism: A third-person perspective on the self” in Mind and Language
  • Arnaud, S. (2020), Emotional Consciousness in Autism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27(9-10), 34-59.
  • Arnaud, S. (2020) “A social-emotional salience account of emotion recognition in autism: moving beyond theory of mind” in Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000174
  • Pendoley, K., & Arnaud, S. (2020), “Intentionalism, Ambivalent emotions, and the body”, in B. Brogaard & D. E. Gatzia (eds.), Being of two minds: the philosophy and psychology of ambivalence, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Routledge.
  • Prinz, J., & Arnaud, S. (Forthcoming), “Emotions”, in B. Young & C. D. Jennings (eds.), Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience, Part IV (Situating the Mind). Routledge Press.
  • Arnaud, S. (2019), Sensibilité et conscience émotionnelle dans l’autisme. Revue Médecine et Philosophie, 1(1).
  • Arnaud, S. & Gratton, C. (2018), « Les femmes en philosophie, qu’est-ce que ça mange en hiver? », Glad!(3) Juin 2018, 30 p. (“Women in philosophy, how to understand this rare species?”)
  • Arnaud, S. (2018), « Autisme », version Grand Public, in M. Kristanek (dir.), l’Encyclopédie philosophique, URL: http://encyclo-philo.fr/autisme-gp/
  • Faucher, L., & Arnaud, S. (2018) “Raisons morales, motivations morales et psychopathologies”, in: Quels lendemains pour la responsabilité ? Perspectives multidisciplinaires, dir. Marchildon A. & Duhamel A., Nota Bene, collection bleue.
  • Arnaud, S. (2016), Troubles du spectre autistique. Une agentivité morale objective, rigoriste et émotionnelle – BioéthiqueOnline 2016, 5/12.

Under Review

  • What are unconscious emotions? (presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, SPP 2019, San Diego)
    • The goal of this paper is to solve the contradiction that emerges from assessing the existence of unconscious emotions by proposing a distinction between two meanings of emotional consciousness that are compatible with the actual leading views on consciousness in neuroscience, without differentiating different senses of “emotions” or of “consciousness”.
  • Internal intentionalism and the understanding of emotion experience. Written with K. Pendoley
  • Loving objects: can autism explain objectophilia? Co-written with D. Gatzia
    • We propose that autism can constitute a better explanation of objectophilia than the other existing attempts of explanation