Publications

Forthcoming

  • Arnaud, S. (2020) “Emotional consciousness in autism” in Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  • Arnaud, S. (2020) “A social-emotional salience account of emotion recognition in autism: moving beyond theory of mind” in Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.
  • Pendoley, K., & Arnaud, S. (2020), “Intentionalism, Ambivalent emotions, and the body”, in B. Brogaard & D. E. Gatzia (eds.), Being of two minds: the philosophy and psychology of ambivalence, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Routledge.
  • Prinz, J., & Arnaud, S. (2020), “Emotions”, in B. Young & C. D. Jennings (eds.), Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience, Part IV (Situating the Mind). Routledge Press.

Published

Under Review

  • What are unconscious emotions? (presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, SPP 2019, San Diego)
    • The goal of this paper is to solve the contradiction that emerges from assessing the existence of unconscious emotions by proposing a distinction between two meanings of emotional consciousness that are compatible with the actual leading views on consciousness in neuroscience, without differentiating different senses of “emotions” or of “consciousness”.
  • Internal intentionalism and the understanding of emotion experience. Written with K. Pendoley
  • Self-consciousness in autism: A third-person perspective on the self
    • By reviewing an important part of the empirical literature on emotions in autism that has been neglected, I suggest that autistic people relate to themselves in a third-person perspective, an objective and explicit mode of access, while neurotypical people tend to access the different dimensions of their self through a first-person perspective. This assumption sheds light on different autistic traits involving interactions with others, usage of narratives, sensitivity and interoception, and emotional consciousness.
  • Loving objects: can autism explain objectophilia? Co-written with D. Gatzia
    • We propose that autism can constitute a better explanation of objectophilia than the other existing attempts of explanation